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Sack: Plurality Influence: Reed Elsevier and the Precedential Value of

Plurality Influence: Reed Elsevier and
the Precedential Value of Bazzle on
Class Arbitrability
Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett1
I. INTRODUCTION
Class arbitration is a tricky process to navigate as it introduces more parties,
higher stakes, and more procedures than typical bilateral arbitration. Because
class arbitration is more complex, the determination as to whether an arbitration
agreement authorizes class arbitration (class arbitrability) is an important one, and
the entity that makes the class determination should be knowledgeable about class
procedures in order to be suited to make such an important finding. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, the Sixth Circuit held that the determination of class arbitrability should be presumptively reserved to judicial courts,
not arbitrators, unless the arbitration agreement expressly provides otherwise.2
This Note discusses the circuit split that arose following the Sixth Circuit's holding in Reed Elsevier, and then explores the precedential value of United States
Supreme Court plurality opinions. In conclusion, this note argues that Reed Elsevier highlights the jurisprudence of recent Supreme Court cases; together, these
cases indicate a shift away from Bazzle3 and are more persuasive than any single
plurality opinion.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Plaintiff Craig Crockett (Crockett), of the former law firm Dehart & Crockett,
P.C., contracted with LexisNexis 4 in 2007 for a Subscription Plan (Plan) to access
legal research databases. 5 For a flat, monthly fee, subscribers to the Plan would
receive unlimited access to certain databases, but access to other databases would
not be covered by the Plan and would result in additional fees. 6 Crockett claimed
that LexisNexis assured its subscribers that a warning sign, such as a dollar sign,
would appear to notify subscribers before they accessed a database not included in
the Plan.7
After several years of subscription to the Plan, Crockett made a complaint to
LexisNexis that his firm was being charged additional fees and that LexisNexis

1. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 599. Commentators suggest that parties include express language in arbitration provisions
regarding the availability of class arbitration. See, e.g., Ilana Haramati, The Future of Class Arbitration: Lessons from Oxford HealthPlansLLC v. Sutter, 60-DEC FED. LAW. 73, 75 (2013).
3. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that
arbitrators should presumptively determine class arbitrability).
4. LexisNexis is a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. Reed Elsevier, 7 3 4 F.3d at 595.
5. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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was not providing the promised warning signs before firm employees accessed
non-Plan databases. 8 Crockett alleged that LexisNexis insisted the fees be paid
regardless. 9 Dehart & Crockett dissolved, and Crockett then established10 the
Crockett Firm, which subscribed to a materially similar Plan with LexisNexis.
The Plan contained an arbitration provision.11 In 2010, in accordance with

the agreement, Crockett brought a demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association alleging numerous state-law claims against LexisNexis relating

to the additional fees.12 As other subscribers to LexisNexis encountered similar
fee issues, Crockett made a request for class arbitration on behalf of two putative
classes: one class composed of law firms charged additional fees by LexisNexis,
and another class of the law firms' clients who ultimately bore the cost of the
additional fees.13
LexisNexis responded by filing suit in the federal Southern District of Ohio,
moving for a declaration that the Plan's arbitration clause did not permit class
arbitration and an injunction that would prevent Crockett from continuing with the
class certification.1 4 The district court held that the arbitration agreement did not
permit classwide arbitration,15 granting summary judgment to LexisNexis
on the
16
declaratory claim and dismissing the injunctive claim without prejudice.
Crockett appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the determination of class arbitrability should have been a decision for an arbitrator, not
the district court.17 Crockett also urged on appeal that 1if8 class arbitration was not
permitted, the arbitration provision was unconscionable.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in that the arbitration clause did
not permit class arbitration. 19 First, the Sixth Circuit dismissed Crockett's unconscionability argument, finding that the absence of a class arbitration provision is

not unconscionable because the free market offers alternative subscriptions to

8. Id.
9. Id.

10. Id.
11. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596. In relevant part, the arbitration agreement provided that each
party would bear its own attorney's fees and costs, the parties would equally divide arbitrator fees,
issues of arbitrability would be determined by federal substantive and procedural law, and other substantive issues would be governed by New York law unless otherwise specified. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Crockett, No. 3:10CV248, 2012 WL 604305, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2012), aff'd sub nom. Reed
Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013).
12. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596. The arbitration demand included claims of "fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, unjust enrichment, and violation of
the New York Consumer Protection Act" and alleged damages in excess of $500 million. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Reed Elsevier, 2012 WL 604305, at *8. The district court reviewed United States Supreme
Court cases dealing with issues of arbitrability and class arbitration, and though no majority opinion
was dispositive on the issue of class arbitrability, the district court found that the conclusion to make
class arbitration a gateway issue to be decided by courts was most in keeping with the Supreme
Court's rulings. Id.
16. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596.
17. Id. at 597.
18. Id. at 600. Crockett argued the clause was fully one-sided in favor of LexisNexis: the clause
required arbitration to occur in Dayton, Ohio (the location of LexisNexis's headquarters), required
Crockett to pay his own legal fees even if LexisNexis's charges were found to be improper, and required Crockett to split the cost of arbitrator fees, an unusual practice for a corporation. Id.
19. Id. at 600.
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legal databases without arbitration clauses.20 Next, observing that the arbitration
agreement was silent as to class arbitration, 1 the Sixth Circuit dismissed the argument that the agreement authorized an arbitrator to make class arbitrability
determinations.2 2 Looking to the collective thrust of United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with class arbitrability, 3 the Sixth Circuit found class arbitration to
be a "gateway issue" of arbitrability. 4 The Sixth Circuit held that the "gateway"
question of whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration is to be
decided by the judicial courts unless expressly stated otherwise by the parties.2 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Arbitration is a matter of consent.2 6 When a party moves to compel arbitration, unless otherwise provided in the contract, the first step is for a court to determine whether the parties' contract authorizes the arbitration.2' However, when
a party seeks to compel class arbitration and the contract is silent as to class arbitration, it has been unclear whether the certification of the class should lie presumptively with the courts or with the arbitrator.28 This issue has led to a circuit
split.2 9 Additionally, if an arbitration clause in a commercial contract is deemed to
waive class arbitration, the lack of availability of class procedures for consumers
30
does not by itself render the arbitration clause unconscionable or unenforceable.
A. The Issue ofArbitrability
Arbitrability is the threshold determination of whether parties consented to
arbitration in a contract. 31 In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,32 the United
States Supreme Court found arbitrability a "gateway" matter to be decided before
a case can be sent to arbitration. 33 Gateway matters are presumptively "for judicial determination," unless there is evidence in the agreement that "clearly and
unmistakably" authorizes an arbitrator to determine arbitrability. 34 When an arbitration provision is unclear or ambiguous regarding arbitrability, the question
should presumptively remain with the courts. 35 In First Options of Chicago, Inc.
20. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that Westlaw, another legal research database provider, had no
arbitration agreement at all in its contracts. Id.
21. Id. at 599.
22. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599.
23. Id. at 597-98.
24. Id. at 599. Issues of arbitrability are those that must be determined by a court before the case

can be sent to arbitration. Id.
25. Id.

26. Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1989).
27. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
28. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).
29. Compare Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d 594, and Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291
(PGS)(DEA), 2014 WL 202763 (D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014), with Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 413
F.App'x. 487 (3d Cir. 2011), and Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109 (C.D. Cal.
2013).
30. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
31. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.
32. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
33. Id. at 83-84.
34. Id. at 83 (quoting AT&T Techs. Inc., 475 U.S. at 649).
35. Id. at 84.
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v. Kaplan,3 6 the Supreme Court provided a two-step test for classifying issues of
arbitrability: first, the determination turns on whether a court or an arbitrator is
authorized to decide arbitrability,37 and second, whether
the entity is authorized to
38
interpret the contract to find if it authorizes arbitration.
The Court drew a distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" questions of arbitrability in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston3 9 Substantive arbitrability questions are considered gateway matters, probing whether the parties
agreed to submit to arbitration, and are for the courts to determine. 40 Procedural,
or subsidiary, questions are those that "grow out of the dispute and bear on its
final disposition," such as the determination of the procedures authorized by the
parties for arbitration. 41 Ultimately, courts decide "substantive"
questions, and
"procedural" questions are left to the arbitrator to decide. 42
B. Class Arbitration and Arbitrability
The United States Supreme Court has not squarely decided whether class ar43
bitration is a gateway issue of arbitrability or merely a "procedural" question.
The Court has determined a number of issues about class arbitration that bear on
the question of class arbitrability and provide helpful context to the "gateway"
44
analysis.
When the parties to an arbitration agreement expressly authorize an arbitrator
to decide if the provision permits class arbitration, the arbitrator is permitted to
interpret the provision regarding class arbitration. 45 In Oxford Health Plans LLC
v. Sutter,46 the parties explicitly stipulated to allow the arbitrator to decide class
arbitrability. 47 The Court found that because the parties had expressly authorized
this, the arbitrator had the power to perform the task of determining class arbitrability. 48 In contrast, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds InternationalCorp,49 no
such explicit authorization existed, and the Court refused to impose class arbitration on the parties when 50
there was no contractual basis to conclude the parties
agreed to such procedures.
The only case in which the Court analyzed class arbitrability fully was in the
plurality opinion of Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle.51 In Bazzle, the plurali-

36. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
37. Such authorization may be expressly included in the arbitration provision or the parties may
stipulate as to which entity may decide arbitrability. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
38. Id. at 944-45.
39. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1964).
40. Id. at 558.
41. Id. at 557.
42. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 945 (1995).
43. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).
44. See generally Oxford, 133 S. Ct. 2064; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S.
662 (2010); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
45. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
46. Oxford, 133 S. Ct. 2064.
47. Id. at 2065.
48. Id at 2071.
49. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 662.
50. Id. at 664-65.
51. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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ty found that the presumption of determining class arbitration is given to the
courts, not an arbitrator. 52 The plaintiffs in Bazzle obtained various real estate
loans from Green Tree, a commercial lender, 53 and each loan contract contained
an arbitration clause that did not expressly mention class arbitration. 54 The plaintiffs alleged that Green Tree failed to provide them with a particular form at the
time of the transaction that would allow the plaintiffs to name their own lawyer
and insurance agent, and Green Tree's failure to do so violated South Carolina
state law.55 Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clauses in the contracts, and the plaintiffs sought to certify the claims as a class
action.56 The state court compelled arbitration, and upon selection of an arbitrator,
the arbitrator made the determination to certify class arbitration.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court found that the parties' arbitration clauses authorized the arbitrator to decide all disputes relating to
the contract, including the issue of class arbitration. 58 Additionally, the Court
explained that class arbitration was not a gateway dispute of arbitrability to be
decided by a court, but rather dealt with arbitration procedures and should be determined by the arbitrator.59
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court highlighted the fact that
Bazzle, as a plurality opinion, was not conclusive as to the issue of class arbitrability. 60 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court described the switch from bilateral arbitration to
classwide arbitration as "fundamental, '61 which contrasts with the description of
class arbitration as merely "procedure" in Bazzle. 62 Elaborating on the differences
between bilateral and classwide arbitration, the Court first noted that class arbitration no longer simply resolves a single dispute between two parties to an agreement, but could also potentially include hundreds of parties that were not originally contemplated by an arbitration provision.
The Court recognized that while
privacy and confidentiality considerations are benefits of bilateral arbitration, the
structure of class arbitrations does not allow for such benefits. 64 Finally, the costs
and commercial value of class arbitration is comparable to class litigation, but
class arbitration provides
65 fewer protections to parties due to limited judicial review of arbitral awards.

52. Id. at 445.
53. Id. at 447-48.
54. Id. at 448.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 449.
57. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 449 (2003).
58. Id. at 451-52.
59. Id. at 452-53.
60. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 679 (2010); see also Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).
61. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686.
62. Bazle, 539 U.S. at 453.
63. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686.
64. Id. See SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, RULE 9(a), American Arbitration
Association (2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url/cs/groups/commercial/documents/
document/dgdf/mda0/-edisp/adrstg 004129.pdf.
65. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686-87.
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Another concern raised by the Court regarding class arbitration involved due
process protections for absent class members. 66 For class action litigation in
court, there are procedural protections in place requiring notice and consent for
absent class members. 67 In the arbitration context, the switch to classwide arbitration expands the binding nature of the outcome beyond the two parties to affect
the rights of absent parties. 68 Thus, notice and consent protections normally present in class action litigation may be absent in class arbitration. 69 This poses a
significant problem: a person is not bound by a judgment unless that person is
named as a party or made a party by service of process, so unnamed absent class
members may not be bound by a class arbitral ruling. 0 Additionally, arbitrators
are not generally knowledgeable about the procedural aspects of certification and
notice for absent parties when employing class procedures. 1
Justice Alito, in his concurrence to Oxford, reiterated, "class arbitration is a
matter of consent."72 Absent class members are never afforded the opportunity to
consent to class arbitration in a contract between the parties in dispute. Because
they do not assent to inclusion in the class, absent parties may not be bound because they gave no authority to the arbitrator to make that determination. 4
Providing opt-out notices does not remedy the problem because silence is not
normally construed to alter the terms of a contract.7 5 Justice Alito argued that
class arbitral awards could be subject to collateral attack, allowing absent class
members to claim the benefit of a favorable judgment while remaining unbound in
the case of an unfavorable judgment. 76
C. CircuitSplit on Class ArbitrabilityDeterminations:Presumptively
Court or Arbitrator?
Aside from the 2013 Sixth Circuit decision in Reed Elsevier, which held class
arbitrability to be a gateway matter to be presumptively decided by courts, 77 one
circuit court of appeals 78 and two district courts in other circuits 79 have weighed in
on the issue. 80 The District of New Jersey agreed with the Reed Elsevier analysis
favoring courts,81 while the Third Circuit and the Central District of California

66. Id. at 686. See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845-46 (1999); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct.
2071-72 (2013).
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3) (2006).
68. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686.
69. Id.
70. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846.
71. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
72. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.at 2072.
77. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013).
78. See Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 413 F.App'x. 487 (3d Cir. 2011).
79. See Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291, 2014 WL 202763 (D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014);
Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
80. As of May, 2014.
81. Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *6.
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favored the Bazzle plurality opinion that arbitrators should presumptively decide
issues of class arbitrability. 8
Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., was a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in 2011 that found arbitrators should be the presumptive decision maker for waiver of class arbitrability.83 The plaintiffs were employees of Travelers who sought
to bring a class action suit against Travelers to recover unpaid wages and overtime
compensation.8 4 The plaintiffs' contracts with Travelers each contained an identical arbitration provision that did not expressly address class arbitration, but authorized Travelers to amend the provision at any time upon appropriate notice to
the employees." Prior to the instigation of this suit, Travelers amended the contracts to include an express waiver of class arbitration, and then notified employees by electronic communications. 86 Both parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute,
but the plaintiffs claimed that the amended arbitration provision did not bind them
because they never assented to its terms.87 Drawing heavily on Bazzle, the Third
Circuit found class arbitration waivers to be a "procedural"
question of arbitration,
88
within the presumptive province of the arbitrator.
After the Reed Elsevier decision, the federal district court for the Central District of California89 in 2013 decided Lee v. JPMorganChase & Co. and held class
arbitrability determinations are "procedural" and therefore a question presumptively for arbitrators. 90 Lee arose regarding claims by appraisers, who worked for
JPMorgan, alleging that JPMorgan violated California and federal labor laws as
well as a California unfair competition law.91 Pursuant to the appraisers' employment contracts containing an arbitration clause silent as to class arbitration,
JPMorgan successfully moved to compel arbitration. 92 Because the appraisers
sought class procedures, the parties asked the district court to resolve the issue of
who should determine class arbitrability: the arbitrator or the court. 93 Persuaded
by Bazzle and Vilches, the district court found that the arbitrator should presump94
tively determine whether an arbitration provision authorizes class arbitration.
The court specifically rejected an analysis using Stolt-Nielsen, finding that StoltNielsen only addressed the issue of how to interpret whether an arbitration
provi95
sion authorizes class arbitration, not who should make the interpretation.
In 2014, the district court for the District of New Jersey decided Chassen v.
Fidelity NationalFinancial,Inc.9 6 Although it sits in the Third Circuit, the district
court refused to follow Vilches, instead approving the analysis in Reed Elsevier
that gives the determination of class arbitrability to the courts. 97 The plaintiffs
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Vilches, 413 F.App'x. at 491; Lee, 982 F. Supp.2d at 1112.
Vilches, 413 F.App'x. at 492.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Id. at491.
The Central District of California is in the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id. at I111.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291, 2014 WL 202763 (D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014).
Id. at *6.
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were a class who paid settlement agents to facilitate their real estate settlement
transactions, and then brought a class action suit against the agents to recover
excess fees allegedly collected by the agents.98 Pursuant to the arbitration provisions in their contracts, the agents sought to compel individual arbitration, 99 even
though the provisions were silent as to class arbitration. 00 In finding that the
court should presumptively decide class arbitrability, the district court relied on
both the statement in the United States Supreme Court case AT&TMobility LLC10v.1
Concepcion that arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class actions
and also the four factors in Stolt-Nielsen that observe the impact of class procedures on arbitration. 1° ' Because the factors from Stolt-Nielsen were present, and
because the facts were similar to Reed Elsevier, the district court found class procedures to be poorly suited for arbitration and determined1 0that
arbitration should
3
be presumptively reserved as a gateway matter to the court.
D. PrecedentialValue of Plurality Opinions
The precise precedential value of Supreme Court plurality decisions, such as
Bazzle, is unclear. In Marks v. United States,1°4 the Supreme Court developed the
"narrowest grounds" doctrine for interpreting decisions by a fragmented Court.1 0 5
Under this doctrine, the holding of a no-clear-majority Court is construed as the
"position taken by those [Justices] who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'10 6 The federal circuit courts have applied this doctrine in generally
two ways. The first is the "implicit consensus" approach, in which the courts look
to the plurality opinion and other concurring opinions to determine the narrowest
holding that is common to all plurality and concurring opinions.107 Second, there
is the "predictive" approach, which identifies the "narrowest grounds" among
plurality and concurring opinions and treats that opinion as controlling1 0for
its utili8
ty in predicting the outcome of future cases of similar factual patterns.
The Supreme Court has not applied the Marks doctrine consistently to cases
that revisit issues previously decided by plurality opinion. The doctrine was applied in a straightforward manner in early cases, 10 9 but disregarded entirely in
other cases like Nichols v. United States.110 The Court intimated that lower courts
may have to determine whether the outcome of the "narrowest grounds" test
98. Id. at*1.
99. Id. at* 1.
100. Id. at *6.
101. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
102. Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291, 2014 WL 202763, at *5 (D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014);
see also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (factors in Stolt-Nielsen).
103. Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *6.
104. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
105. Id.at 193.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
3054 (1992).
108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
109. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'n Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988), and Casey, 947
F.2d 682.
110. 511 U.S. 738 (1994). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (holding that a "plain
view" doctrine requirement set forth in a prior plurality opinion was "not a binding precedent").
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would be a viable "logical possibility," making the Marks doctrine one of selective applicability.111
E. Unconscionability
The affirmative defense of unconscionability exists when there is "an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
'
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."112
The Third Circuit Court
113
of Appeals and New York state courts have found that even when an arbitration
provision does not permit class arbitration, the contract is not rendered unconscionable.114 A number of courts have found that decisions regarding unconscionability based on a lack of a class arbitration provision are to be decided under
federal law, regardless of whether the parties' contract calls for the application of
state law.115
In the commercial contracts context, the United States Supreme Court determined that a contractual waiver of class arbitration does not itself render an arbitration clause unenforceable.11 6 In American Express Company v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,117 a number of merchants brought antitrust claims against American
Express for using monopoly power to set its prices artificially high.118 These merchants had contracted with American Express to accept its credit cards at their
venues, and the contracts contained arbitration clauses that expressly waived class
arbitration. 119 American Express moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant
to the arbitration clause, but the merchants countered by arguing that the lack of
availability of class procedures made the cost of individual arbitration prohibitively high, and therefore the waiver of class arbitration made the arbitration clause
unenforceable. 120 The Supreme Court, in analyzing the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 121 found that because the FAA, the federal antitrust statutes, nor any other
congressional command provided for the rejection of a waiver of class arbitration,
the waiver remained enforceable because the parties specifically contracted for
it.122 In the absence of a contrary congressional command, the Court found that a
waiver of class arbitration does not render an arbitration clause unenforceable.123

111. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46. The Court found it "not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the
utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have
considered it[,]" pointing to such confusion among lower courts as a possible reason to reexamine the
doctrine at issue. Id.
112. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
113. See Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).
114. See Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 2003).
115. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants' Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2011); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
116. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2308.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
122. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
123. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court in finding that the arbitration agreement did not authorize class arbitration,
thereby granting summary judgment to LexisNexis, denying injunctive relief to
Crockett, and dismissing Crockett's unconscionability claim.12 4 In so holding, the
Sixth Circuit found that absent an express agreement to the contrary, certification
of class arbitration is an issue of arbitrability reserved to the courts.125
Dismissing Crockett's argument that class arbitrability should by default be
determined by the arbitrator, the Sixth Circuit looked to a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions to discern the Supreme Court's likely position on the
issue, 116 and found that gateway issues are fundamental issues to be determined by
courts."' The Sixth Circuit also found that courts have been wary to regard silence and ambiguity in arbitration provisions as the basis for allowing arbitrators
to make such determinations.18
In finding class arbitrability a gateway issue, the Sixth Circuit first debunked
Crockett's reliance on the holding in Bazzle.129 Because Bazzle was a plurality
opinion, the Sixth Circuit noted that it is not precedential, pointing to the recent
cases of Stolt-Nielsen and Oxford Health Plans, which both stated that the issue of
class arbitrability had not been expressly decided by the Supreme Court.130
The Sixth Circuit recounted the Supreme Court's four observations about the
fundamental differences between bilateral and classwide arbitration. 131 First,
while the purpose of arbitration is to be low-cost and efficient, classwide procedures increase costs, reduce efficiency, and call into question all parties' mutual
consent to such procedures. 132 Second, a certain level of confidentiality is expected in arbitration, but class arbitration often raises confidentiality issues, likely
unanticipated by parties who agree to arbitration. 133 Third, class arbitration raises
the commercial value of the case greatly, even though the scope of available judicial review remains limited in the arbitral setting. 134 Finally, due process concerns
arise with classwide arbitration, as class arbitration purports to adjudicate the
rights of absent parties and those parties should be afforded notice. 135 Without a
showing that absent parties authorized an arbitrator to decide the issue on a classwide basis, such as the opportunity to opt in, the absent parties may not even be

124. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2013).
125. Id. at 599 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 83 (2002)).
126. Id. at 597-98.
127. Id. at 597 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83). An example of such a fundamental issue would be
whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement. Id. (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
128. Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)).
129. Id.
130. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 680 (2001), and Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685).
133. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011), and StoltNielsen, 559 U.S. at 686).
134. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686-87).
135. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686, and Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751).
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bound by the arbitrator's decision.13 6 The Sixth Circuit found these differences
between bilateral and class arbitration to be fundamental, determining that the
issue of class arbitrability lies presumptively with the courts as a gateway issue of
arbitrability, unless the parties clearly and explicitly provided otherwise.137
Having determined that class arbitrability is an issue that falls by default to
the courts, the Sixth Circuit refused to find the arbitration provision under review
expressly assigned authority to the arbitrator to make the class arbitrability determination."' The Sixth Circuit conceded that the phrase "any controversy . . .
arising out of or in connection with this Order" could include the issue of class
arbitration,13 9 but because the provision lacked any reference to class arbitration, it
could also be easily read to apply only to bilateral arbitration.1 40 As the arbitration
agreement was, at best, silent or ambiguous on class procedures, the Sixth Circuit
found this was insufficient to overcome the presumption that class arbitrability
should be decided by a court.1 41 The
1 42parties' mere agreement to arbitrate did not
implicitly authorize class arbitration.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected Crockett's claim that the arbitration provision was unconscionable.1 43 Although the court agreed with Crockett that the
clause was highly one-sided in favor of LexisNexis, 144 the Sixth Circuit determined that the presence of an arbitration clause that is one-sided or adhesive in
nature, or that lacks a class action provision, does not by itself make the provision
unenforceable.1 45 Finding this arbitration
1 46 agreement to be no different, the Sixth
Circuit did not find it unconscionable.
V. COMMENT
In Reed Elsevier, the Sixth Circuit confronted the class arbitrability issue that
the United States Supreme Court had avoided in Oxford,147 holding that courts and
not arbitrators should presumptively determine class arbitrability, absent express
agreement to the contrary. 148 This precipitated a circuit split on the issue: a New
Jersey district court in the Third Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit's analysis in
Reed Elsevier,14 9 whereas a California district court in the Ninth Circuit rejected
the Reed Elsevier approach in favor of a Bazzle-based analysis.150 These contrasting approaches to class arbitrability, coupled with the Supreme Court's lan136. Id. (quoting Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071-72 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
137. Id. at 598-99 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
138. Id. at 599.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013).
142. Id. at 600 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2001)).
143. Id. (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)).
144. Id. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the provisions favoring LexisNexis.
145. Id. The Sixth Circuit suggested seeking a solution in the free market, such as the alternate legal
database Westlaw, which compels no such arbitration provision. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n. 2 (2013).
148. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013).
149. See Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291, 2014 WL 202763, at *6 (D. N.J. Jan. 17,
2014).
150. See Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
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guage in Oxford,151 make it likely that the Supreme Court will take up the issue in
the near future.
The contrasting foundational arguments made in these opposing cases are of
note. The district court's argument in Lee rests upon the perception of class arbitration as a "procedure" of arbitration.152 Under this analysis, the use of class
procedures does not bear on whether a dispute is arbitrable, but merely alters the
mechanisms employed by the arbitrator in facilitating the arbitration.153 Because
arbitration clauses generally provide that all disputes arising out of the contract are
subject to arbitration, the availability of class procedures could be considered
another dispute to be resolved by an arbitrator.15 4 This outcome rests heavily on
the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Bazzle for support.155
The courts in Reed Elsevier and Chassen relied instead on policy justifications promulgated by the Supreme Court that suggest arbitration is a venue poorly
situated to employ class procedures.15 6 Both courts first noted that in Stolt-Nielsen
and Oxford, the Supreme Court has explicitly found the Bazzle plurality is not
controlling authority and that no holding on the issue of class arbitrability has yet
been made.157 Looking instead to the language in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion,
the courts found the shift from bilateral to classwide arbitration to be fundamental
and not well suited to arbitration.158 The courts observed policy factors such as
reduced efficiency, absent party consent, confidentiality concerns, and higher
commercial stakes such as changing the nature of arbitration with the addition of
class procedures.15 9 Such fundamental issues, they asserted, are meant to be substantive gateway matters of arbitration to be presumptively determined by
courts.

160

The basic differentiation in these conflicting arguments lies in the courts' perceptions of "class arbitration." Courts such as those in Lee and the similar Third
Circuit case of Vilches, relying on Bazzle, view class procedures as mechanisms of
arbitration, perceiving no problems by allowing the arbitrator to interpret the contract and determine the availability of class arbitration. 161 The opposing view of
the Reed Elsevier and Chassen courts looks beyond the mechanism of class pro1 62
cedures to the functional impact that class procedures will have on arbitration.
While the formalist approach of the Lee and Vilches courts provides a fair analysis

151. Oxford, 133 S. Ct. 2068 n.2. The Court's language, "this Court has not yet decided whether the
availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability ... [b]ut this case gives us no opportunity
to do so..." suggests that such a decision may be soon forthcoming. Id.
152. Lee, 982 F. Supp.2d at 1112.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1113.
156. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013);
Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291, 2014 WL 202763, at *5 (D. N.J. Jan. 17, 2014) (both
quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1742).
157. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598; Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *4 (both citing Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n. 2 (2013)).
158. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598; Chassen,2014 WL 202763, at *5.
159. Id.
160. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598-99; Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *6.
161. Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Vilches v. Travelers Cos., Inc., 413 F.App'x. 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2011).
162. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598; Chassen,2014 WL 202763, at *5.
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of the role of arbitration, the more persuasive view is the prudential and predictive
arguments of the courts in Reed Elsevier and Chassen.

The precedential value of plurality opinions, such as Bazzle, is highly suspect.
' 163
Plurality opinions are often considered "inherently muddled and fragmented,"
'164
and they "create confusion and inefficiency in the lower courts.
The erratic
application of the Marks doctrine in interpreting plurality opinions on their "narrowest grounds"'1 65 does little to dispel this problem. If the Marks doctrine can
indeed be applied selectively as suggested by recent Court decisions like Nichols,
lower courts appear to have substantial discretion in deciding whether to give
deference to Supreme Court plurality opinions.166 This discretion is apparent in
the recent class arbitrability cases, with the courts in Vilches and Lee considering
Bazzle to be persuasive, while the Reed Elsevier and Chassen courts refused to
follow it.
Plurality opinions should be persuasive, not mandatory, authority.1 67 Instead
of imposing the views of a non-majority of the Supreme Court on lower courts,
such an approach would allow the lower courts to observe the plurality for guidance, 168 but would also permit the courts to seek additional persuasion elsewhere.
This would allow courts that would otherwise feel bound to a plurality opinion to
look to other sources, such as subsequent Supreme Court cases or the opinion's
application in other circuits. Such outside persuasive sources can help a court to
make a more informed and well-rounded decision.
If Bazzle were treated instead as persuasive authority, the lower courts could
look instead to the practical effects of Bazzle on the court system. Bazzle was the
first Supreme Court case to tacitly approve class arbitration as a valid form of
arbitration, 169 which resulted in the development of Class Rules by the American
Arbitration Association.1 7 0 For example, the arbitration panel in Stolt-Nielsen
perceived a consensus among arbitrators that Bazzle was generally considered the
rule regarding class arbitrability 1 7 1 The influence of Bazzle appears wellingrained in the arbitration system, supporting the courts in Vilches and Lee in
their reliance on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bazzle.
In contrast, the lower courts could also observe the Supreme Court cases that
17 2
have been decided recently. As noted, the Court's language in Stolt-Nielsen,

163. Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court PluralityDecision: Interpretationin HistoricalPerspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 261, 287 (2000).
164. James A. Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: JudicialReasoning, Lower Courts, and the
Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2008). See also John F.
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE L.J. 59, 62 and Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme CourtPluralityDecisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992).
165. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
166. Hochschild, supra note 163, at 282.
167. For a similar approach, see Thurmon, supra note 164, at 451-57.
168. Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court PluralityDecisions, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 756, 760 (1980).
169. S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "'Changethe Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T,
and a Return to FirstPrinciples, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 206 (2012).
170. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 662 (2001), and Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, supra note 62.
171. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673-74.
172. Id. at 679, 686 (finding the shift from bilateral to classwide arbitration to be "fundamental").
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Concepcion,173 and Oxford174 indicates a shift in the Court's attitude toward class
arbitrability that favors courts to make the determination. 175 Because the Court's
recent cases regarding class arbitrability indicate a probable shift away from the
reasoning that Bazzle employed, these cases become highly persuasive,
as depict176
ed in the arguments made by the courts in Reed Elsevier and Chassen.
Ultimately, when Bazzle is taken as a persuasive plurality opinion, the influence of recent Supreme Court discussions on class arbitrability outweighs the
influence of Bazzle on the practical application of class arbitrability in the field of
arbitration. Absent the Supreme Court indicating such a shift in recent cases, the
practical influence of Bazzle would surely be more persuasive. However, in light
of the Court's strong language indicating that courts should presumptively decide
class arbitrability, lower courts would do better to observe where the Supreme
Court is heading in the future, rather than relying on the framework established by
a plurality of the past. Thus, the courts in Reed Elsevier and Chassen have a better-supported outcome by deferring to the recent Supreme Court indications and
selecting courts as the presumptive body to decide class arbitrability.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Reed Elsevier, the Sixth Circuit held that class arbitrability decisions
should be the province of courts, absent an express agreement by the parties to the
contrary. 177 This decision precipitated a circuit split on the issue, with one court
178
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that courts should make such determinations,
while two others favored arbitrators to decide class arbitrability. 179 Whereas Reed
Elsevier and Chassen depart from the plurality holding in Bazzle, 180 Lee and
Vilches embrace the Bazzle reasoning as strongly persuasive,1 81 even though the
Supreme Court has pointedly stated that the class arbitrability issue "has not yet
'
[been] decided."182
Because the Supreme Court's decisions on how to apply plurality decisions have been muddled, 18 3 lower courts would do better to observe
plurality opinions as persuasive and supplement their analysis with outside
sources. Bazzle's general acceptance and application in the field of arbitration
might be considered very persuasive, 18 4 but the language used by the Supreme
1 85
Court in recent cases strongly indicates a departure from the Bazzle opinion,
173. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (finding arbitration to be
poorly suited to class procedures).
174. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n. 2 (2013) (noting that the issue of
class arbitrability was not settled, despite the plurality opinion in Bazle).
175. See notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
176. Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 597-99 (6th Cir. 2013);
Chassen v. Fidelity Nat'l Fin., Inc., No. 09-291 (PGS)(DEA), 2014 WL 202763, at *5-6 (D. N.J. Jan.
17, 2014).
177. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599.
178. Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *6.
179. Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. Supp.2d 1109, 1112-14 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Vilches v.
Travelers Cos., Inc., 413 F.App'x. 487, 491-92 (3d Cir. 2011).
180. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597-98; see also Chassen, 2014 WL 202763, at *4.
181. Lee, 2013 WL 6068601, at *2; Vilches, 413 F.App'x. at 491-92.
182. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n. 2 (2013).
183. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2014/iss2/9

14

Sack: Plurality Influence: Reed Elsevier and the Precedential Value of

No. 2]

PluralityInfluence: Reed Elsevier

393

which carries greater influence than the mere adherence of arbitrators to the
Bazzle approach. Because lower courts should give greater deference to the
marked indications of the Supreme Court majority than to the plurality of the past,
Reed Elseiver achieved the preferable result, which will likely align with a future
Supreme Court decision resolving this current circuit split.
KEVIN P. SACK
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